

Quantifying the Benefits of Labor Mobility in a Currency Union


Christopher L. House
University of Michigan and NBER

Christian Proebsting
KU Leuven



Linda L. Tesar
University of Michigan, NBER and CEPR

Unemployment rates in the euro area

- Wide dispersion in rates across euro area
- Stronger fluctuations at the country level compared to the union level
- Common currency limits the set of policy responses to country-specific shocks



Unemployment rates in the U.S. vs. the euro area



Mundell (1961): *“If factors are mobile across national boundaries then a flexible exchange rate becomes unnecessary.”*

- Factor mobility substitutes for independent monetary policy
- To what extent is this true for the euro area?
- What are the gains if labor was as mobile as it is in the United States?
 - Does migration help reduce the volatility of unemployment?
 - How costly is it for European countries to be in the currency union? Does labor mobility reduce that cost?

Outline

- Present data contrasting migration in the euro area with the United States
- Describe an open-economy model with migration calibrated to the euro area
- Counterfactual experiments: What if...?

U.S. and euro area as integrated economies

- Common currency
- Labor migration
- Integrated market for goods and services
- Integrated (but not fully complete) capital markets
- Central and state/member level fiscal policy
- Political institutions
- Culture/language

U.S. and euro area as integrated economies

- Common currency
- Labor migration
- Integrated market for goods and services
- Integrated (but not fully complete) capital markets
- Central and state/member level fiscal policy
- Political institutions
- Culture/language

Migration Data

United States

- IRS, based on # tax returns that migrate
- 48 states (Lower 48)
- 1977-2018

Europe

- Eurostat, national sources, flows reconciled using methodology for trade data
- Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Spain, France, Italy, Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Finland, Greece, Slovenia, Cyprus, Malta, Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania
- 1995-2018


Less migration in Europe than in the U.S.

$$\text{Migration rate}_{i,t} = \frac{1}{2} \frac{\text{Immigration}_{i,t} + \text{Outmigration}_{i,t}}{\text{Pop}_{i,t}}$$


	Unit	U.S.	Euro
Regions	#	48	18
Population	m	5.5	18.2
Migration Rate	%	3.3	0.7

Less migration in Europe than in the US

Gross migration is four times higher in the US




United States, 1977 - 2018



Euro area, 1995-2018

Migration is rising in Europe... but not to U.S. levels yet



Less migration in Europe than in the US


$$\text{Net migration rate}_{i,t} = \frac{\text{Immigration}_{i,t} - \text{Outmigration}_{i,t}}{\text{Pop}_{i,t}}$$

	Unit	U.S.	Euro
Regions	#	48	18
Population	m	5.5	18.2
Migration Rate	%	3.3	0.7
Net migration rate (std. dev.)	%	0.5	0.4

Idiosyncratic unemployment

Double de-meaning the data:

$$\widehat{ur}_{i,t} \equiv ur_{i,t} - ur_i - (ur_t - ur)$$



Idiosyncratic unemployment

Double de-meaning the data: $\widehat{ur}_{i,t} \equiv ur_{i,t} - ur_i - (ur_t - ur)$

$$\text{var}(ur_{i,t} - ur_i) = \text{var}(\widehat{ur}_{i,t}) + \text{var}(ur_t) + 2\text{cov}(\widehat{ur}_{i,t}, ur_t)$$

Time-series variation
for country i

Idiosyncratic
component

Aggregate
component

Zero on average

Most unemployment is idiosyncratic in the euro area


Double de-meaning the data: $\widehat{ur}_{i,t} \equiv ur_{i,t} - ur_i - (ur_t - ur)$

$$\text{var}(ur_{i,t} - ur_i) = \text{var}(\widehat{ur}_{i,t}) + \text{var}(ur_t) + 2\text{cov}(\widehat{ur}_{i,t}, ur_t)$$


Idiosyncratic component accounts for
80% of total fluctuations in the euro area
but only 30% in the U.S.

Std. deviation of idiosyncratic
component:

2.3 in euro area vs. 1.0 in the U.S.




Variance decomposition



Quantifying the Benefits of Labor Mobility in a Currency Union

Does migration respond to economic conditions?

$$\widehat{nm}_{i,t} = \beta \widehat{ur}_{i,t} + \varepsilon_{i,t}$$



United States, 1977 - 2018


Suppose a labor force participation rate of 0.65.

Then, for every increase of 100 unemployed people, 40 (=26/0.65) people move out.


Does migration respond to economic conditions?

$$\widehat{nm}_{i,t} = \beta \widehat{ur}_{i,t} + \varepsilon_{i,t}$$

Response in euro area less than a third.




United States, 1977 - 2018




Euro area, 1995 - 2018

Cumulative effect



(a) United States



(b) Euro area

Summing up

- Less migration in euro area relative to US
- Unemployment differentials are greater and more persistent in euro area
- Migration less responsive to unemployment differentials in euro area
- Migration response is persistent, significant changes in population in both US and euro area

To evaluate Mundell's trade-off we need ...

- Multi-country model of a currency union (18 countries +RoW)
- Labor migration (Artuc et al. 2010, Caliendo et al. 2015)
- Unemployment (Erceg et al. 2000, Gali 2011)
- Trade (Eaton and Kortum 2002)
- Country-specific shocks

Model: Population

$$N_{i,t} = N_i^k + N_{i,t}^w$$

Capital owners N_i^k

- Immobile
- Labor and capital income
- Inelastic labor supply
- Trade in international (non-contingent) bonds

Workers $N_{i,t}^w$

- Mobile
- Labor income only
- Inelastic labor supply, but can change location of work
- Hand-to-mouth

Model: Migration

A worker who is currently living in country i chooses location according to:

$$v_{i,t} = \max_j \left\{ U(c_{j,t}^w) + \frac{1}{\gamma} \epsilon_{j,t} - \tau_j^i + \beta \mathbb{E}_t(V_{j,t+1}) \right\}$$

Model: Migration

A worker who is currently living in country i chooses location according to:

$$v_{i,t} = \max_j \left\{ U(c_{j,t}^w) + \frac{1}{\gamma} \epsilon_{j,t} - \tau_j^i + \beta \mathbb{E}_t(V_{j,t+1}) \right\}$$

Utility from consuming
in country j



Model: Migration

A worker who is currently living in country i chooses location according to:

$$v_{i,t} = \max_j \left\{ U(c_{j,t}^w) + \frac{1}{\gamma} \epsilon_{j,t} - \tau_j^i + \beta \mathbb{E}_t(V_{j,t+1}) \right\}$$

Utility from consuming
in country j



Random idiosyncratic
benefit from being in
country j

Model: Migration

A worker who is currently living in country i chooses location according to:

$$v_{i,t} = \max_j \left\{ U(c_{j,t}^w) + \frac{1}{\gamma} \epsilon_{j,t} - \tau_j^i + \beta \mathbb{E}_t(V_{j,t+1}) \right\}$$

Utility from consuming
in country j

Random idiosyncratic
benefit from being in
country j

$\epsilon_{j,t} \sim$ Type-I extreme value distribution

Higher γ makes relocation less random

Model: Migration

A worker who is currently living in country i chooses location according to:

$$v_{i,t} = \max_j \left\{ U(c_{j,t}^w) + \frac{1}{\gamma} \epsilon_{j,t} - \tau_j^i + \beta \mathbb{E}_t(V_{j,t+1}) \right\}$$

Utility from consuming
in country j

Random idiosyncratic
benefit from being in
country j

Cost of moving from i to j

$\epsilon_{j,t} \sim$ Type-I extreme value distribution

Higher γ makes relocation less random

Model: Migration

A worker who is currently living in country i chooses location according to:

$$v_{i,t} = \max_j \left\{ U(c_{j,t}^w) + \frac{1}{\gamma} \epsilon_{j,t} - \tau_j^i + \beta \mathbb{E}_t(V_{j,t+1}) \right\}$$

Utility from consuming
in country j

Random idiosyncratic
benefit from being in
country j

Cost of moving from i to j

Expected value from
living in country j in
 $t+1$

$\epsilon_{j,t} \sim$ Type-I extreme value distribution

Higher γ makes relocation less random

Model: Migration

Specification pins down share of workers that relocate from i to j :

$$n_{j,t}^i = \frac{\exp \left\{ \gamma \left(U(c_{j,t}^w) - \tau_j^i + \beta \mathbb{E}_t(V_{j,t+1}) \right) \right\}}{\sum_k \exp \left\{ \gamma \left(U(c_{k,t}^w) - \tau_j^i + \beta \mathbb{E}_t(V_{k,t+1}) \right) \right\}}$$

Model: Migration

Specification pins down share of workers that relocate from i to j :

$$n_{j,t}^i = \frac{\exp \left\{ \gamma \left(U(c_{j,t}^w) - \tau_j^i + \beta \mathbb{E}_t(V_{j,t+1}) \right) \right\}}{\sum_k \exp \left\{ \gamma \left(U(c_{k,t}^w) - \tau_j^i + \beta \mathbb{E}_t(V_{k,t+1}) \right) \right\}}$$

$$\tilde{n}_{j,t}^i - \tilde{n}_{i,t}^i = \gamma \left[\tilde{c}_{j,t}^w - \tilde{c}_{i,t}^w + \beta \mathbb{E}_t(\Delta V_{j,t+1} - \Delta V_{i,t+1}) \right]$$

Model: Migration


Specification pins down share of workers that relocate from i to j

$$n_{j,t}^i = \frac{\exp \left\{ \gamma \left(U(c_{j,t}^w) - \tau_j^i + \beta \mathbb{E}_t(V_{j,t+1}) \right) \right\}}{\sum_k \exp \left\{ \gamma \left(U(c_{k,t}^w) - \tau_j^i + \beta \mathbb{E}_t(V_{k,t+1}) \right) \right\}}$$

Law of motion for workers in country i

$$N_{i,t}^w = \sum_j n_{i,t}^j N_{j,t-1}^w$$

Model: Labor market




Households:

Supply labor inelastically

Randomly assigned to a type and to a labor union

Risk-sharing guarantees same wage across households

Model: Labor market




Labor aggregating firms:

Labor types aggregated in “effective” labor L

Profit maximization delivers a type-specific (linear) labor demand curve

Model: Labor market




Labor unions:


Given labor demand, maximize wage income for each type.

Market power results in wage markup and unemployment.

Model: Labor market



Model: Labor market



Wage Phillips curve:

$$\pi_{i,t}^w = -\frac{(1-\theta_w\beta)(1-\theta_w)}{2\theta_w} \frac{ur_{i,t}-ur_i}{1-ur_i} + \beta \mathbb{E}_t (\pi_{i,t+1}^w)$$

Workers' consumption

$$c_{i,t}^w = w_{i,t}(1 - ur_{i,t})$$

Migration decision linked to unemployment rate and wage

Model: Goods markets

Material goods producers

Hire capital and labor to produce material inputs, m

Each firm produces a variety of m

Monopolistically competitive so charge a markup

Calvo mechanism for price adjustment

Intermediate Goods

Combine m into varieties of traded intermediate goods with CES technology

Varieties traded subject to trade costs (Eaton & Kortum)

Domestic and foreign varieties combined into a final T good

Combine m into a NT good.

Shock to NT productivity

Final goods

T good and NT good combined with CES technology

Final good used for consumption, investment and government

Shock to preference weight between T and NT goods.

Was Mundell right? Does labor mobility substitute for flexible exchange rates?

Step 1: Fit the model to European data.

Calibrate most parameters, estimate a few.

Was Mundell right? Does labor mobility substitute for flexible exchange rates?

Step 1: Fit the model to European data.

Calibrate most parameters, estimate a few.

Step 2: Use the model to answer 2 questions

1. Does labor mobility stabilize economies?
2. Does labor mobility reduce the cost of joining a currency union?

Calibration and estimation of model

	(1)	(2)
	Data	Baseline model
Estimated Parameters		
Migration propensity (γ)		0.14
Investment adjustment cost (f'')		1.20
Utilization adjustment cost (a'')		0.02
Persistence preference weights (ρ_ω)		0.96
Persistence TFP shocks (ρ_Z)		0.88
Targeted Moments		
Slope coefficient $\widehat{nm}_{i,t}$ on $\widehat{ur}_{i,t}$	-0.08	-0.08
Volatility investment to GDP	3.63	3.55
Volatility utilization to GDP	0.98	1.02
GDP (GDP)	0.95	0.94
Unemployment (ur)	-0.63	-0.58
Persistence $\varepsilon_{i,t}^\omega$	0.00	0.33
Persistence $\varepsilon_{i,t}^Z$	0.00	0.07

Elasticity of net migration to changes in relative unemployment (slope for European data)



1. Stabilizing fluctuations

Counterfactual: Adjust γ to match U.S. slope coefficient (-0.26)

	No mobility		Baseline mobility			High mobility	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Fixed	Float	Fixed	Float	Flex	Fixed	Float
Panel A: Volatility, Per-Capita Variables (percent)							
Unemployment rate	2.36	0.24	2.28	0.24	0.00	1.73	0.27
GDP per capita	4.46	3.44	4.43	3.50	3.55	3.37	3.41
Consumption per capita	2.89	2.03	2.80	2.01	2.06	2.02	1.88
Net migration	0.00	0.00	0.19	0.17	0.16	1.77	1.60
Panel B: Volatility, Aggregate Variables (percent)							
GDP	4.46	3.44	4.09	3.37	3.53	6.44	6.19
Consumption	2.89	2.03	3.34	2.81	2.81	6.96	6.56

Counterfactual: Assume independent monetary policy

Counterfactual: Flexible prices and wages

1. Stabilizing fluctuations

	No mobility		Baseline mobility			High mobility	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Fixed	Float	Fixed	Float	Flex	Fixed	Float
Panel A: Volatility, Per-Capita Variables (percent)							
Unemployment rate	2.36	0.24	2.28	0.24	0.00	1.73	0.27
GDP per capita	4.46	3.44	4.43	3.50	3.55	3.37	3.41
Consumption per capita	2.89	2.03	2.80	2.01	2.06	2.02	1.88
Net migration	0.00	0.00	0.19	0.17	0.16	1.77	1.60
Panel B: Volatility, Aggregate Variables (percent)							
GDP	4.46	3.44	4.09	3.37	3.53	6.44	6.19
Consumption	2.89	2.03	3.34	2.81	2.81	6.96	6.56


Migration reduces volatility of per-capita variables, but amplifies volatility of aggregate variables.

1. Stabilizing fluctuations

	No mobility		Baseline mobility			High mobility	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Fixed	Float	Fixed	Float	Flex	Fixed	Float
Panel A: Volatility, Per-Capita Variables (percent)							
Unemployment rate	2.36	0.24	2.28	0.24	0.00	1.73	0.27
GDP per capita	4.46	3.44	4.43	3.50	3.55	3.37	3.41
Consumption per capita	2.89	2.03	2.80	2.01	2.06	2.02	1.88
Net migration	0.00	0.00	0.19	0.17	0.16	1.77	1.60
Panel B: Volatility, Aggregate Variables (percent)							
GDP	4.46	3.44	4.09	3.37	3.53	6.44	6.19
Consumption	2.89	2.03	3.34	2.81	2.81	6.96	6.56

Independent monetary policy can be very effective in reducing unemployment volatility and bring it close to flex-price solution.

1. Stabilizing fluctuations



Basic patterns for unemployment volatility hold for most countries.

2. Welfare cost of a currency union

Standard techniques from New Keynesian literature (see Woodford, 2003; Gali, 2008)

Welfare loss = additional consumption required to compensate for...

- inefficient consumption fluctuations (relative to flex-price)
- reduced average consumption due to wage inflation
- reduced average consumption due to price inflation

Separate calculation for workers and capital owners

Cost of union = welfare cost under fixed less welfare cost under floating

Mundell's question: Does labor mobility reduce the cost of sharing a currency?

2. Welfare cost of a currency union

	No mobility		Baseline mobility			High mobility	
	(1) Fixed	(2) Float	(3) Fixed	(4) Float	(5) Flex	(6) Fixed	(7) Float
Panel D: Welfare Costs (euros per capita)							
Consumption gap workers	3	0	2	0	0	1	0
Consumption gap capital owners	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Migration gap workers	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Wage inflation	51	8	47	9	0	24	11
Material price inflation	227	77	224	84	0	188	108
Workers (Total)	197	57	191	62	0	143	79
Capital owners (Total)	362	114	354	124	0	281	159
Total	280	85	273	93	0	212	119
Cost of Currency Union (euros per capita)							
Total	195	—	180	—	—	93	—

2. Welfare cost of a currency union

Welfare cost mostly reflect inflation

	No mobility		Baseline mobility			High mobility	
	(1) Fixed	(2) Float	(3) Fixed	(4) Float	(5) Flex	(6) Fixed	(7) Float
Panel D: Welfare Costs (euros per capita)							
Consumption gap workers	3	0	2	0	0	1	0
Consumption gap capital owners	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Migration gap workers	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Wage inflation	51	8	47	9	0	24	11
Material price inflation	227	77	224	84	0	188	108
Workers (Total)	197	57	191	62	0	143	79
Capital owners (Total)	362	114	354	124	0	281	159
Total	280	85	273	93	0	212	119
Cost of Currency Union (euros per capita)							
Total	195	—	180	—	—	93	—

2. Welfare cost of a currency union

Cost of union: 180 euros p. a. p. cap.


	No mobility		Baseline mobility			High mobility	
	(1) Fixed	(2) Float	(3) Fixed	(4) Float	(5) Flex	(6) Fixed	(7) Float
Panel D: Welfare Costs (euros per capita)							
Consumption gap workers	3	0	2	0	0	1	0
Consumption gap capital owners	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Migration gap workers	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Wage inflation	51	8	47	9	0	24	11
Material price inflation	227	77	224	84	0	188	108
Workers (Total)	197	57	191	62	0	143	79
Capital owners (Total)	362	114	354	124	0	281	159
Total	280	85	273	93	0	212	119
Cost of Currency Union (euros per capita)							
Total	195	—	180	—	—	93	—

2. Welfare cost of a currency union

U.S.-level mobility would reduce cost of currency union by one half,...

	No mobility		Baseline mobility			High mobility	
	(1) Fixed	(2) Float	(3) Fixed	(4) Float	(5) Flex	(6) Fixed	(7) Float
Panel D: Welfare Costs (euros per capita)							
Consumption gap workers	3	0	2	0	0	1	0
Consumption gap capital owners	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Migration gap workers	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Wage inflation	51	8	47	9	0	24	11
Material price inflation	227	77	224	84	0	188	108
Workers (Total)	197	57	191	62	0	143	79
Capital owners (Total)	362	114	354	124	0	281	159
Total	280	85	273	93	0	212	119
Cost of Currency Union (euros per capita)							
Total	195	—	180	—	—	93	—

2. Welfare cost of a currency union



For the average euro area citizen, mobility would reduce the cost of the union by 87 euros...

... but there is substantial heterogeneity across countries!

Average gains driven by Spain and Germany.

For most countries, mobility makes union more costly (Mundell upside down!)



Why?

2. Welfare cost of a currency union

Simulate model feeding in only 1 type of shock at a time.

In a world with preference shocks, mobility **reduces** cost of union.

In a world with TFP shocks, mobility **raises** cost of union



2. Welfare cost of a currency union

Supply and demand shocks in a currency union

Recall: welfare costs driven by inflation.

Positive demand shock:

Output \uparrow , inflation \uparrow

Inflow of additional workers eases inflationary pressure

Positive supply shock:

Output \uparrow , inflation \downarrow


Inflow of additional workers puts more downward pressure on prices

Migration destabilizes inflation in the face of supply shocks! Mundell upside down.


Was Mundell right? Yes and no.

- Euro area country unemployment rates are about 2.5 more volatile than U.S. state unemployment rates
- Higher (U.S.-level) labor mobility in Europe would reduce this gap by about 25%.
- Welfare cost of currency union would fall by one half,...
- ... but not all countries gain!


Migration is lower in Europe... ... even after controlling for country size



Does migration respond to economic conditions?




(a) UNITED STATES: 1977 - 2018




(b) EURO AREA: 1995 - 2018

Migration in the U.S. during the Great Recession



(a) Raw Data



(b) Demeaned Data

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Data	Baseline model	Only ω shocks	Only Z^N shocks
Other Moments				
<i>Time-Series Standard Deviation</i>				
Unemployment rate (ur)	2.28	2.28	2.43	0.73
Consumption per capita (C)	2.80	2.80	2.05	2.00
Investment per capita (I)	8.07	12.93	2.71	12.11
GDP per capita	2.45	3.64	2.23	2.85
GDP	2.60	3.73	2.25	2.94
Inflation	2.20	2.72	0.65	2.71
Net exports over GDP ($\frac{nx}{GDP}$)	1.24	0.96	0.41	1.18
Net migration rate (nm)	0.26	0.18	0.16	0.09
<i>Persistence</i>				
Net exports over GDP ($\frac{nx}{GDP}$)	0.89	0.96	0.96	0.96
Investment per capita (I)	0.88	0.96	0.97	0.96
Net migration rate (nm)	0.65	0.83	0.86	0.74
<i>Correlation with GDP</i>				
Consumption per capita (C)	0.80	0.96	0.93	1.00
Investment per capita (I)	0.84	0.79	0.73	0.99
Net exports over GDP ($\frac{nx}{GDP}$)	-0.43	-0.51	0.36	-0.79
Inflation (π)	0.07	0.05	0.85	-0.03