

THE REGIONAL KEYNESIAN CROSS

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
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
Heterogeneous Agents in Macroeconomic Models, Prague

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MONETARY POLICY HAS HETEROGENEOUS EFFECTS ACROSS US REGIONS




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- I Why is there regional heterogeneity in the employment response to MP?
- II Does it matter for the aggregate transmission of monetary policy?

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IV **Quantitatively** replicate empirical joint distribution + counterfactuals

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- ◇ State dependency → regional heterogeneity neutral in US, 30% amplification in ITA

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LITERATURE

I Heterogeneous Agents New Keynesian models (Campbell and Mankiw, 1989; Bilbiie, 2008; Werning, 2015; Challe et al., 2017; Debortoli and Galí, 2018; Kaplan et al., 2018; Auclert, 2019; Hagedorn et al., 2019; de Ferra et al., 2020; Auclert et al., 2020, 2021a,b, 2023; Ravn and Sterk, 2020; Dupor et al., 2023; Acharya et al., 2023; Patterson, 2023)

- ◇ Heterogeneity & MPCs shape the transmission of MP
- ◇ **Our contribution:** regional setting, heterogeneity both within & across regions matters

II Optimal Currency Areas (Mundell, 1961; McKinnon, 1963; Kenen, 1969; Alesina et al., 2002; Kenen and Meade, 2008; Farhi and Werning, 2016, 2017)

- ◇ Openness to trade determines potency of monetary and fiscal stabilization tools
- ◇ **Our contribution:** heterogeneity between union members

Integrate I & II → framework for MP transmission across regions + empirically testable insights

- ▶ **MP across space** (Carlino and Defina, 1998; De Ridder and Pfajfar, 2017; Hauptmeier et al., 2023; Corsetti et al., 2021; Herreño and Pedemonte, 2022; Almgren et al., 2022; Costain et al., 2022)
- ▶ **Sequence space methods** (Mankiw and Reis, 2006; Boppart et al., 2018; Auclert et al., 2023)
- ▶ **Open-economy macroeconomics** (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995; Galí and Monacelli, 2005, 2008; Rey, 2013; Miranda-Agrippino and Rey, 2020)
- ▶ **Cross-sectional identification** (Nakamura and Steinsson, 2014, 2018; Beraja et al., 2018; Chodorow-Reich et al., 2021; Hazell et al., 2022; Wolf, 2021a,b)

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$$\max_{\{c_{jit}, b_{jit+1}\}} \mathbb{E}_0 \sum_{t \geq 0} \beta_j^t \{u(c_{jit}) - v(l_{jit})\} \quad \text{s.t.} \quad c_{jit} + b_{jit+1} = \frac{W_{jt}}{P_{jt}} e_{jit} l_{jit} + (1 + r_t) b_{jit}, \quad b_{jit+1} \geq \underline{b}_j$$

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- ▶ **Two sectors**: $\ell_{jit} = \left[\alpha_j^{-\frac{1}{\eta}} (\ell_{jit}^{NT})^{\frac{\eta+1}{\eta}} + (1 - \alpha_j)^{-\frac{1}{\eta}} (\ell_{jit}^T)^{\frac{\eta+1}{\eta}} \right]^{\frac{\eta}{\eta+1}}$, $y_{jt}^s = \ell_{jt}^s$, **unions + rigid wages**

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- ◇ Regional **aggregate consumption function** captures all the heterogeneity:

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- ◇ Define **Jacobian** matrices + stack in vector notation:

$$(M_j)_{ts} = \frac{\partial \log C_{jt}(\cdot)}{\partial \log Z_{js}}, \quad (M_j^r)_{ts} = \frac{\partial \log C_{jt}(\cdot)}{\partial \log(1 + r_s)}, \quad dL_j \equiv (d \log L_{j1}, d \log L_{j2}, \dots)'$$

THE REGIONAL KEYNESIAN CROSS

PROPOSITION

The 1st-order response dL_j to a monetary shock dr & tradable demand shock dC^T solves:

$$dL_j = \underbrace{\rho_j (M_j^r dr + M_j dL_j)}_{\text{Regional exposure}} + \underbrace{(1 - \rho_j) dC^T}_{\text{National exposure}}$$

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THE NATIONAL KEYNESIAN CROSS

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
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$$dL = \underbrace{\left(M + \text{Cov}(\rho_j, M_j) \right)}_{\text{national multiplier}} dL + \underbrace{\left(M^r + \text{Cov}(\rho_j, M_j^r) \right)}_{\text{national interest rate channel}} dr + \text{Cov}((1 + \rho_j - \rho) M_j, dL_j)$$

- ▶ **Joint distribution** of MPCs and non-tradability across regions matters


Model Meets Data

THE GEOGRAPHY OF MPCs



- ▶ 2-step procedure to compute MPCs at the county-level, extend Patterson (2023):


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
- ◇ Step I: regress MPCs on bins for income, education, age, wealth & race → store coefficients
- SCE* ←

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
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
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
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- ▶ Account for full distribution of agents along economic & socio-demographic characteristics

THE GEOGRAPHY OF NON-TRADABLE EMPLOYMENT




- ▶ Non-tradable sector classification based on Mian & Sufi (2014)
- ▶ Annual employment data from US Census County Business Pattern
- ▶ Non-tradable employment & MPCs **negatively correlated** across counties ≈ -0.25

REGIONAL HETEROGENEITY IN THE RESPONSE TO MP



- ▶ Large regional heterogeneity in the response to MP

REGIONAL HETEROGENEITY IN THE RESPONSE TO MP




- ▶ Large regional heterogeneity in the response to MP
- ▶ ... but does it matter for the aggregate?

STATE DEPENDENT MONETARY TRANSMISSION

- ▶ Compare national response under regional heterogeneity with repr. region:



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

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- ▶ State dependency \rightarrow potency of MP depends on full regional distribution



CONCLUSION AND WAY FORWARD

- ▶ Regional heterogeneity in response to MP explained theoretically and empirically by:
 - ◇ Local MPC
 - ◇ Local share of the non-tradable sector

- ▶ Multiplier non-linear in MPC & ρ_j → joint distribution matters for aggregate
 - ◇ State dependency: regional heterogeneity amplifies MP in Italy, not in US

- ▶ Portable framework: follow-up project on €-zone → heterogeneous fiscal policy

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Thanks!

Appendix


- ▶ Panel local-projection (weighted by 2000 population):

$$\Delta \log(L_{jt+h}) = \alpha_{jh} + \delta_{th} + \sum_{j=1}^J \beta_{jh} \times D_{jh} \times \varepsilon_t + \sum_{\ell=1}^{12} \gamma_{h\ell} \Delta \log(L_{jt-\ell}) + u_{jht}$$

- ◇ D_{jh} : Dummy for county j
- ◇ α_{jh} : county fixed effect
- ◇ δ_{th} : time fixed effect \Rightarrow absorbs the shock
- ◇ β_{jh} : county-specific slope \Rightarrow unexplained heterogeneity

THE DISTRIBUTION OF COUNTY-SPECIFIC RESPONSES

▶ BACK



Parameter	Description	Value	Comment
σ	Inverse IES	1	Standard
φ	Frisch Elasticity	1	Chetty et al. (2011)
ψ	Labor disutility	1	Normalization
ν	Elasticity of substitution between the two goods	1.5	Hazell et al. (2022)
η	Elasticity of substitution between the two sectors	0.45	Berger et al. (2022)
ω	Preference for non-tradables	0.66	Hazell et al. (2022)
ρ_e	Persistence of the log-productivity process	0.966	McKay et al. (2016)
σ_e	Cross-sectional std of log-productivity process	0.017	McKay et al. (2016)
\underline{b}	Borrowing limit	-1	Target $r = 4\%$ annually

- ▶ Use self-reported MPC out of capital losses from Fuster et al. (2020)

$$MPC_{it} = \alpha + \delta_t + \underbrace{\sum_{s=1}^5 \beta_s^R D_{sit}^R}_{\text{Race bins}} + \underbrace{\sum_{s=1}^4 \beta_s^A D_{sit}^A}_{\text{Age bins}} + \underbrace{\sum_{s=1}^9 \beta_s^Y D_{sit}^Y}_{\text{Income bins}} + \underbrace{\sum_{s=1}^5 \beta_s^E D_{sit}^E}_{\text{Educ. bins}} + \underbrace{\sum_{s=1}^4 \beta_s^W D_{sit}^W}_{\text{Wealth bins}} + u_{it}$$

- ▶ Use ACS to bin households in groups g . Group-specific MPC:

$$\widehat{MPC}_g = \hat{\alpha} + \sum_{s=1}^5 \hat{\beta}_s^R D_{gs}^R + \sum_{s=1}^4 \hat{\beta}_s^A D_{gs}^A + \sum_{s=1}^9 \hat{\beta}_s^Y D_{gs}^Y + \sum_{s=1}^5 \hat{\beta}_s^E D_{gs}^E + \sum_{s=1}^4 \hat{\beta}_s^W D_{gs}^W$$


- ▶ County-level MPC: avg. of group-specific MPCs, weighted by share of hhs in each group:

$$MPC_{jt} = \sum_g s_{jtg} \widehat{MPC}_g$$


$$\Delta \ln(L_{jt+h}) = \underbrace{\alpha_{jh} + \delta_{th}}_{\text{Fixed effects}} + \underbrace{\beta_h^{NT} \times D_{jt}^{NT} \times \varepsilon_t}_{\text{Openness interaction}} + \underbrace{\beta_h^M \times D_j^M \times \varepsilon_t}_{\text{MPC interaction}} + \underbrace{\dots}_{\text{Interaction \& lagged controls}} + u_{jht}$$

▶ Baseline group: high MPC, high non-tradables counties

- I β_h^{NT} : high MPC, low non-tradables counties less responsive than baseline
- II β_h^M : low MPC, high non-tradables counties less responsive than baseline



β_h^{NT}



β_h^M

HORSE-RACE : MPCs & NON-TRADABLES WIN

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- ▶ Run horse-race with LASSO:

$$\hat{\alpha} = \underset{\alpha}{\operatorname{argmin}} \quad \|\beta - X\alpha\| + \lambda \sum_i |\alpha_i|$$


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
$$\hat{\alpha} = \underset{\alpha}{\operatorname{argmin}} \quad \|\beta - X\alpha\| + \lambda \sum_i |\alpha_i|$$

- ▶ Increase λ and plot "survival function"
- ▶ Local MPCs & non-tradable empl. important




CORRELATION BETWEEN MPCs AND ρ

▶ BACK



MATCHING THE REGIONAL STRUCTURE

- ▶ Calibration computationally intensive with 3000+ counties
- ▶ Draw samples of $N = 10$ representative counties from empirical distribution
- ▶ Pick the sample closest to moments of interest
- ▶ Calibrate β_j and α_j to match the $\{\widehat{MPC}_j, \widehat{\rho}_j\}_{j=1}^N$ in the model's steady state
 - ◊ Match the empirical MPC to the first entry in M_j



- ▶ Plot on-impact response for 3,000 calibrated counties in the (ρ_j, MPC_j) space
 - I Response increasing in MPC
 - II Effect of MPC on the response **increasing in ρ** ← MPC- ρ complementarity in the multiplier
 - III Response decreasing in ρ for low MPC and increasing in ρ for high MPC
 - ◇ Opposite channels: multiplier vs trade exposure

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